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In recent years, there has been a rising interest in authenticated encryptionwith associated data (AEAD)which combines encryption
and authentication into a unified scheme. AEAD schemes provide authentication for a message that is divided into two parts:
associated data which is not encrypted and the plaintext which is encrypted. However, there is a lack of chaos-based AEAD
schemes in recent literature.This paper introduces a new 128-bit chaos-basedAEAD scheme based on the single-key Even-Mansour
and Type-II generalized Feistel structure. The proposed scheme provides both privacy and authentication in a single-pass using
only one 128-bit secret key. The chaotic tent map is used to generate whitening keys for the Even-Mansour construction, round
keys, and random s-boxes for the Feistel round function. In addition, the proposed AEAD scheme can be implemented with true
randomnumber generators tomap amessage tomultiple possible ciphertexts in a nondeterministicmanner. Security and statistical
evaluation indicate that the proposed scheme is highly secure for both the ciphertext and the authentication tag. Furthermore, it
has multiple advantages over AES-GCM which is the current standard for authenticated encryption.
1. Introduction
Encryption and authentication of data are traditionally per-
formed by two separate algorithms under the influence of
different secret keys. This is known as generic composition
which has three variations: Encrypt-and-MAC, MAC-then-
Encrypt, and Encrypt-then-MAC [1]. Recently, there has been
a rising interest in the field of authenticated encryption
with associated data (AEAD) which combines encryption
and authentication into a unified scheme. It deals with the
cryptographic problem of sending a message that has to be
entirely authenticated but divided into two parts: associated
data (additional information such as packet headers) that
must be sent in the clear and the actual plaintext that must be
encrypted [2]. AEAD schemes are alsomore efficient and less
prone to implementation errors, unlike generic composition
[3]. This is because an AEAD scheme can be implemented
without extensive cryptographic knowledge and is easy for
interoperability [4]. As it only requires one key for both
privacy and integrity, it saves on key bits and key setup time
and reduces the risk of users selecting insecure parameters.
The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security,
Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) [5] was introduced
in 2014 to identify authenticated ciphers that offer advantages
over AES-GCM, which has weak key problems and is suscep-
tible to a cyclic attack [6]. CAESAR is currently in its second
round of evaluation, with 30 candidate ciphers remaining.
AEAD proposals for CAESAR need to have higher level of
security and be as fast as AES-GCMor faster than AES-GCM
with similar security level. The design of AEAD schemes is
based on various constructs such as block ciphers, stream
ciphers, and sponge constructions.
The aim of this paper is to construct an AEAD scheme
based on chaos theory that is secure and efficient and fulfils
the requirements set by CAESAR. For additional security, the
AEAD scheme is designed to be able to take advantage of true
randomnumber generators (TRNG) to resist statistical-based
cryptanalysis. Due to the existence of efficient and uniformly
distributed software-based TRNGs, it is feasible to utilize
true random numbers in cryptographic algorithms. These
TRNGs take advantage of physical phenomena that occur
within computing hardware such as multicore processors
[7], graphics processing units [8], or hard disks [9] and
quantifies them to generate nondeterministic numbers. As
the inputs of AEAD schemes include secret and public
message numbers, TRNGs can be implemented to generate
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secret message numbers to provide immunity to statistical-
based cryptanalysis.
In this paper, a new AEAD scheme based on the chaotic
tent map is proposed. It is designed based on the single-key
Even-Mansour construction [10] and utilizes key-dependent
random s-boxes. Both the whitening keys for the Even-
Mansour scheme and s-boxes are generated based on chaos.
The proposed AEAD scheme requires only a single-pass to
produce both the authentication tag (MAC) and ciphertext.
The cipher is evaluated for resistance against cryptanalytic
attacks and its security is also analysed based on thorough
statistical testing. Although not compulsory, the AEAD
scheme can be implemented alongside a TRNG to provide
immunity to statistical-based cryptanalysis.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
provides an introduction toAEAD schemes and chaoticmaps
that are vital to understanding the rest of the paper. Section 3
describes the proposed AEAD algorithm in detail, followed
by Section 4 that analysed its security.The paper is concluded
in Section 5 with some closing remarks.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. The fol-
lowing are inputs to an authenticated encryption algorithm
along with their corresponding security requirements (𝐼 =
Integrity, 𝑃 = Privacy):
(i) Variable-length plaintext (ip)
(ii) Variable-length associated data (i)
(iii) 𝑞-bit secret message number (ip)
(iv) 𝑝-bit public message number/nonce (i)
(v) 𝑘-bit secret key
The output of an AEAD scheme consists of a ciphertext with
the same length as the plaintext (except for schemes with
secretmessage numberswhich have extra blocks of ciphertext
depending on the size of 𝑞) and an authentication tag orMAC
of 𝑡 bits. AEAD schemes need not support secret message
numbers (𝑞 = 0) but require unique nonces for semantic
security.The inputs to an authenticated decryption algorithm
include the ciphertext, associated data, nonce, and secret key.
The secret message number will be extracted from ciphertext.
It outputs the plaintext if verification is successful; otherwise
the algorithm outputs an error message.
2.2. Chaotic Maps. Chaotic maps are deterministic dynam-
ical systems that have random-like behavior, sensitivity to
slight changes in initial parameters, ergodicity, diffusion, and
confusion characteristics. These qualities are analogous to
requirements in cryptographic algorithms; thus chaotic maps
have been used to design hash functions [11], encryption algo-
rithms [12], key exchange protocols [13], and digital signature
schemes [14]. Authenticated image encryption schemes based
on chaos have been introduced by Bakhshandeh and Eslami
[15] as well as Yang et al. [16]. However, they are both
generic composition schemes with a distinct hash function
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Figure 1: Tent map bifurcation diagram.
and encryption algorithm. No chaos-based, unified AEAD
schemes have been introduced in recent literature.
The chaotic tent map is used to design the proposed
AEAD scheme as shown in (1), where 𝛽 is the control
parameter that falls within the range of [0, 2]. In addition to
being a fast and simple map, the tent map is selected because
it has been widely studied and applied in the field of chaotic
cryptography. The behavior of the chaotic map evolves from
periodic to aperiodic as 𝛽 increases from 0 to 2 as shown in
the tent map’s bifurcation diagram in Figure 1. The proposed
AEAD sets 𝛽 = 1.99999 for all tent map iterations.
𝑐 (𝑥𝑡+1) = {{{
𝛽𝑥𝑡 0 ≤ 𝑥𝑡 < 0.5𝛽 (1 − 𝑥𝑡) , 0.5 ≤ 𝑥𝑡 ≤ 1. (1)
Recent literature has shown that unimodal chaotic maps
such as the tent map are susceptible to initial condi-
tion/parameter estimation techniques using statistical tools
[17, 18]. Another problem of digital chaotic systems is
dynamical degradation that occurs due to finite precision,
which leads to short cycle lengths [19]. These problems can
be addressed by using chaotic perturbation which changes
the trajectory of the chaotic map’s orbit by modifying its
initial condition using external values. The proposed AEAD
scheme takes advantage of chaotic perturbation in its design
as discussed in Section 3.
In software, chaotic map iterations involve real numbers
that are usually represented by floating point variables.
However, floating point operations are slower than binary
operations. For faster speed and reproducibility, fixed point
(FxP) representation [20] is used in the proposed AEAD
scheme. A 32-bit FxP variable consists of the two most
significant bits (MSB) that represent integers before the radix
point and the 30 least significant bits (LSB) that represent
fractional bits.
3. Design Specifications
3.1. Parameters and Notations. All integers stated in the
following algorithms are in hexadecimal format. Prior to
modification by the nonce or secret keys, the initial values for
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Table 1: Block shuffle 𝜋 and inverse block shuffle 𝜋−1.
𝑥 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 𝑎 𝑏 𝑐 𝑑 𝑒 𝑓𝜋(𝑥) 5 0 1 4 7 𝑐 3 8 𝑑 6 9 2 𝑓 𝑎 𝑏 𝑒𝜋−1(𝑥) 1 2 𝑏 6 3 0 9 4 7 𝑎 𝑑 𝑒 5 8 𝑓 𝑐
(1) Input: 64-bit secret key values 𝑘0 and 𝑘1.
(2)Output: Initialized variables 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑟0, 𝑟1.
(3)—
(4) //Initialize variables
(5) 𝑥 ← (82𝑑𝑐𝑏𝑒4𝑒 ⊕ 𝑘0) ∧ Φ, 𝑦 ← (49𝑎2372𝑐 ⊕ 𝑘1) ∧ Φ
(6) 𝑝 ← (49𝑎2372𝑐 ⊕ (𝑘0 ≫ 30)), 𝑞 ← (945𝑎𝑒69𝑏 ⊕ (𝑘1 ≫ 30))
(7) 𝑟0 ← (3⊞8(𝑘0 ≫ 62)), 𝑟1 ← (3⊞8(𝑘1 ≫ 62))
(8) for 𝑖 = 0 to 3 do
(9) 𝑐50(𝑥)
(10) 𝑐50(𝑦)
(11) 𝑥 ← (𝑥 ⊕ (𝑝⊞32rcon4𝑖)) ∧ Φ
(12) 𝑝 ← rotl32𝑟0 (𝑝 ⊞32rcon4𝑖+1)
(13) 𝑦 ← (𝑦 ⊕ (𝑞 ⊞32rcon4𝑖+2)) ∧ Φ
(14) 𝑞 ← rotl32𝑟1 (𝑞 ⊞32rcon4𝑖+3)
(15) end for
Algorithm 1: Initialization of the Chaos-based RNG.
all registers are arbitrarily chosen random numbers.The pro-
posed 128-bit AEAD scheme has the following parameters:
(i) 128-bit secret key, 𝜅 ∈ {0, 1}128
(ii) 64-bit nonce, 𝜂 ∈ {0, 1}64
(iii) 128-bit secret message number, 𝜏 ∈ {0, 1}128
(iv) Associated data, 𝐴 ∈ {0, 1}∗
(v) Message,𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}∗
(vi) 128-bit tag, 𝑇 ∈ {0, 1}128
The following are notations used in this paper:
(i) Length of a string, 𝑥, denoted by |𝑥|
(ii) ⊕: Bitwise XOR
(iii) ∧: Bitwise AND
(iv) 𝑥 ‖ 𝑦: Bitwise concatenation of 𝑥 and 𝑦
(v) ⊞𝑛: 𝑛-bit modular addition
(vi) rotl𝑛𝑟 (𝑥): Bitwise left rotation by 𝑟 positions on a 𝑛-bit
variable, 𝑥 where 𝑛 = {8, 32, 64}
(vii) 𝑥 ≫ 𝑦: Bitwise right shift of 𝑥 by 𝑦 bits
(viii) 𝑠(𝑥): substitution function using an 8-bit s-box, 𝑠
(ix) 𝑐𝑖(𝑥): performing 𝑖-iterations of the chaotic map with
an initial value 𝑥
(x) ⌊𝑥⌋: floor function to map a real number 𝑥 to the
previous largest integer
(xi) FP(𝑥): converting the FxP representation to real
number
(xii) Φ: mask for the FxP fractional bits
Because the AEAD design involves chaotic map iterations,
round constants are used in several parts of the algorithms
to prevent weak key problems. Weak keys can initialize the
chaotic map’s initial condition to zero, which makes the
system nonrandom and insecure. These round constants are
taken from the list of prime numbers: rcon𝑖 = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11,
13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83,
89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131}, where 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 32 is the
index/round. The proposed AEAD scheme also uses a block
shuffle 𝜋 and its inverse as shown in Table 1.
3.2. Random S-Box Generation. The composition method
[21] is used to generate chaos-based s-boxes for the AEAD
scheme. The composition of two 8-bit permutations, 𝑓(𝑥)
and 𝑔(𝑥), is denoted by ℎ(𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑔(𝑥)), ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐼, where𝐼 is the set of all 8-bit integers. First, a set 𝑆 consisting of
four chaos-based s-boxes is generated by permuting the AES
s-box. To obtain the final s-box, a composition of four s-
boxes from 𝑆 is used, where the s-boxes are selected based
on randomly generated indices (repetitions are allowed). To
generate the numbers used to permute AES and also as
indices for the s-box composition, a chaos-based RNG is
used.The initialization process and the RNG algorithm are as
shown in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively, where 𝑥 and 𝑦 are
chaoticmap initial conditions that are constantlymodified by
perturbation values, 𝑝 and 𝑞.
The initialization process equally divides the secret key
bits 𝜅 = 𝑘1 ‖ 𝑘0 into four registers and two rotation
variables such that all key bits are used only once. During the
initialization, round constants are used to ensure that values
of 𝜅 that initialize all registers to zero will result in nonzero
starting values for the RNG. A total of 200 iterations for each
tent map are performed for transient elimination, although
48 iterations have been deemed sufficient [22].
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(1) Input: 32-bit initial values 𝑥 and 𝑦, 32-bit perturbation values 𝑝 and 𝑞, 8-bit
rotation values 𝑟0 and 𝑟1.
(2)Output: 32-bit random number 𝑅.
(3) —
(4) 𝑐50(𝑥)
(5) 𝑐50(𝑦)
(6) 𝑅 ← ⌊FP(𝑥)⌋ ⊕ ⌊FP(𝑦)⌋
(7) 𝑥 ← (𝑥 ⊕ 𝑝) ∧ Φ
(8) 𝑝 ← rotl32𝑟0 (𝑝)
(9) 𝑦 ← (𝑦 ⊕ 𝑞) ∧ Φ
(10) 𝑞 ← rotl32𝑟1 (𝑞)
Algorithm 2: Chaos-based RNG.
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Figure 2: Key Schedule Feistel Network.
Each 8-bit s-box, 𝑠𝑗 ∈ 𝑆 for 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 4, is first initialized
as the AES s-box. Next, Algorithm 2 is used to generate V𝑗𝑖
for 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 256 for each 𝑠𝑗. Each s-box is then permuted as
follows:
𝑠𝑗 [𝑖] = 𝑠𝑗 [V𝑗𝑖 ] ,
𝑠𝑗 [V𝑗𝑖 ] = 𝑠𝑗 [𝑖] . (2)
To obtain the final s-box, 𝑠𝑓, four additional values are gen-
erated by Algorithm 2. A four-modulo operation is applied
on these values which are then used as s-box indices, 𝐼𝑖 for0 ≤ 𝑖 < 4. The final s-box is a composition of the four s-boxes
indexed by 𝐼: 𝑠𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑠𝐼3(𝑠𝐼2(𝑠𝐼1(𝑠𝐼0(𝑥)))). As 𝑠𝑓 depends
only on 𝜅, it can be precomputed by both parties. 𝑠𝑓 is later
modified by 𝜏 in the actual encryption process.
3.3. Key Schedule Algorithm. The key scheduling algorithm
generates 20 round keys from the secret key 𝜅. As they do
not depend on 𝜂 or 𝜏, the keys can also be precomputed. The
algorithm is based on the Feistel network, whereby the secret
key is first divided into two halves, 𝜅 = 𝑘1 ‖ 𝑘0. 𝑘0 and 𝑘1
are then XOR-ed into two registers that have initial values of
reg0 = 𝑓492𝑒42164𝑐7𝑓𝑏0𝑑 and reg1 = 𝑓683𝑑0𝑎𝑑038𝑓17𝑑.
The tent map’s initial condition is set to 𝑥 = 0. One round of
the key scheduling function is shown in Figure 2, where 𝑖 is
the round number.
The 𝐺-function is described in Algorithm 3. The net-
work is executed 16 times for transient elimination without
producing any keys. Starting from round number 𝑖 = 0, 20
round keys are then produced from 20 rounds of the network.
Excluding transient elimination rounds, each round key is
generated from a total 640 iterations of the chaotic tent map.
The value of 𝑂 is modified 64 times, where, each time, it is
subjected to a four-bit rotation to ensure that all 64 bits are
modified by 𝑥 in 16 passes. reg1 is rotated by 15 bits each
time to ensure that its upper and lower bits are all used in
the chaotic iterations.
3.4. Masking Algorithm. The proposed AEAD scheme is
based on the single-key Even-Mansour construction that has
been proven to have the same level of security as the original
two-key construction [10]. 16 eight-bit mask registers are
first initialized based on the secret key and nonce and then
modified by a chaotic function. The values of these registers
are used as the prewhitening and postwhiteningmasking keys
for each block of data. The initialization of the mask registers
and variables for the chaotic function are summarized in
Figure 3, where 𝜅 = 𝑘1 ‖ 𝑘0.
After the mask and chaotic variables are initialized,
the masking algorithm is iterated eight times for transient
elimination and to diffuse the key bits into all registers.
The masking algorithm is as shown in Algorithm 4 where
registers (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝, 𝑞) are involved in chaotic perturbation.
These registers are then used to modify the mask registers, 𝜆.
Round constants are only used in the transient elimination
rounds to generate nonzero initial mask values. The mask
registers are later modified by 𝜏 in the encryption process.
3.5. Algorithm Description. The overall design of the AEAD
is based on the single-key Even-Mansour scheme [10] and
a Type-II generalized Feistel structure (GFS) [23]. There
are two main functions, 𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 and 𝑎𝑒𝑎d 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡.𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 encrypts𝑀 and 𝜏 and also generates a tag, 𝑇,
to verify 𝐴, 𝑀, and 𝜏. 𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 decrypts 𝐶 to obtain𝑀 and 𝜏 and then generates 𝑇 to verify the authenticity of𝐴, 𝑀, and 𝜏. If verification fails, the decrypted message is
not released to the recipient. The 𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 algorithm is
shown in Figure 4, where 𝑎 is the number of 𝐴 blocks, 𝑚 is
the number of𝑀 blocks, 𝛼 represents intermediate tags, ∑𝑀
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(1) Input: 64-bit register reg1, 32-bit initial condition 𝑥, round number 𝑖.
(2)Output: 64-bit output, 𝑂.
(3) —
(4) 𝑂 ← 0
(5) for 𝑗 = 0 to 63 do
(6) 𝑥 ← 𝑥 ⊕ (reg1 ∧ Φ)
(7) 𝑐10(𝑥)
(8) 𝑂 ← 𝑂 ⊕ 𝑥
(9) 𝑂 ← rotl644 (𝑂)
(10) reg1 ← rotl6415(reg1)
(11) end for
(12) 𝑂 ← 𝑂 ⊕ rcon𝑖
Algorithm 3: Key schedule 𝐺-function.
(1) Input: 8-bit mask registers 𝜆𝑗 for 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 16, 32-bit initial values 𝑥 and 𝑦, 32-bit perturbation
values 𝑝 and 𝑞, round/block number 𝑖.
(2)Output:Modified 8-bit mask registers 𝜆𝑗 for 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 16
(3) —
(4) 𝑥 ← 𝑐1(𝑥), 𝑦 ← 𝑐1(𝑦)
(5) if Transient Elimination then
(6) 𝑥 ← 𝑥 ⊕ (𝑝⊞32 rcon4𝑖)
(7) 𝑦 ← 𝑦 ⊕ (𝑞 ⊞32 rcon4𝑖+1)
(8) 𝑝 ← 𝑝 ⊕ (𝑦⊞32 rcon4𝑖+2)
(9) 𝑞 ← 𝑞 ⊕ (𝑥 ⊞32 rcon4𝑖+3)
(10) else
(11) 𝑥 ← 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑝
(12) 𝑦 ← 𝑦 ⊕ 𝑞
(13) 𝑝 ← 𝑝 ⊕ 𝑦
(14) 𝑞 ← 𝑞 ⊕ 𝑥
(15) end if
(16) for 𝑗 = 0 to 3 do
(17) 𝜆𝑗 ← 𝜆𝑗 ⊞8((𝑥 ≫ (8𝑗)) ∧ 𝐹𝐹)
(18) 𝜆𝑗+4 ← 𝜆𝑗+4 ⊞8((𝑦 ≫ (8𝑗)) ∧ 𝐹𝐹)
(19) 𝜆𝑗+8 ← 𝜆𝑗+8 ⊞8((𝑝 ≫ (8𝑗)) ∧ 𝐹𝐹)
(20) 𝜆𝑗+12 ← 𝜆𝑗+12 ⊞8((𝑞 ≫ (8𝑗)) ∧ 𝐹𝐹)
(21) end for
(22) for 𝑗 = 0 to 15 do
(23) 𝜆𝜋(𝑗) ← 𝜆𝑗
(24) end for
(25) 𝑥 ← 𝑥 ∧ Φ, 𝑦 ← 𝑦 ∧ Φ
Algorithm 4: Mask algorithm.
32 bits
30 bits32 bits
30 bits
k1 k0
kr2 = 59da81e5d1557529 kr1 = 04dd96b922e1bcee kr0 = 541bf7ebe7cd6551
15 14 13 8 2 1 07· · · · · ·
x
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p
MSB − kr0 LSB − kr0
Figure 3: Masking Algorithm Initialization.
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Figure 4: Encryption Algorithm.
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Figure 5: AEAD 𝐹-function.
is the checksum, and𝜆[𝑖] is the set ofmask registers for block-𝑖 of data.The 𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 algorithm has the same structure
as 𝑎𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡. However the inverse block shuffle 𝜋−1 and
reversed round keys are used to decrypt𝐶 and to generate the
intermediate tags, 𝛼𝑀[∗].
3.5.1. Round Function. The round function, 𝐹𝑗, is executed
20 times for all data blocks where 𝑗 denotes the number
of rounds. The same 20 round keys generated by the key
scheduling algorithm are used for all blocks. When process-
ing message blocks (𝑀[∗]), 𝐹20 is divided into two halves,𝐹20 = 𝐹10 ⋅ 𝐹10 where the output of the first 10 rounds is used
as the intermediate tag 𝛼𝑀[∗].The round function is based on
the Type-II GFS as shown in Figure 5. The 64-bit round key𝑟𝑘𝑖 is divided into 8 bytes, where its most significant byte is
fed into the left most ℎ-function. The ℎ-function consists of
two operations, XOR of the round key and substitution:
ℎ (𝑥) = 𝑠𝑓 [𝑋 [𝑑] ⊕ 𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑖 ] , (3)
where 𝑑 and 𝑒 are byte indexes of the data block and round
key, respectively.
3.5.2. Modification of 𝑆-Box and Mask. For further security,𝜏 is used to modify both 𝑠𝑓 and 𝜆 prior to processing
the first block of data. To modify 𝑠𝑓, two more indexes
for s-box composition are obtained from 𝜏, 𝐼0𝜏 , and 𝐼1𝜏 . 𝐼0𝜏
is obtained by XOR-ing each of the eight most significant
bytes of 𝜏 whereas 𝐼1𝜏 is obtained by XOR-ing each of the
eight least significant bytes. The final s-box is computed by
composing two additional s-boxes: 𝑠final(𝑥) = 𝑠𝐼1
𝜏
(𝑠𝐼0
𝜏
(𝑠𝑓(𝑥))).
Themodification of 𝜆 registers is performed by XOR-ing each
byte of 𝜏 to each byte of 𝜆.
3.5.3. AEAD Mode. The encryption and tag generation pro-
cess is as follows:
(1) Using 𝜅, generate 𝑟𝑘𝑖 for 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 20 and 𝑠𝑓.
(2) Initialize 𝜆 based on 𝜅 and 𝜂.
(3) Encrypt 𝜏 to obtain 𝐶[0] and 𝛼𝜏.
(4) Generate 𝑠final and modify 𝜆 using 𝜏 (Section 3.5.2).
(5) If |𝐴| and |𝑀| are not 128-bit multiples, pad 𝐴 and𝑀
with a single bit of “1,” followed by all “0” until the
required length.
(6) Encrypt 𝐴[𝑗] for 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑎 and XOR results to obtain𝛼𝐴.
(7) Encrypt𝑀[𝑗] to obtain 𝛼𝑀[𝑗] and 𝐶[𝑗 + 1], where 0 ≤𝑗 < 𝑚.
(8) Compute ∑𝑀. Encrypt ∑𝑀 and XOR the result with𝛼𝜏, 𝛼𝐴, and 𝛼𝑀[∗]. Perform one final encryption to
obtain 𝑇.
The decryption and tag verification process is as follows:
(1) Using 𝜅, generate 𝑟𝑘𝑖 for 0 ≤ 𝑖 < 20 and 𝑠𝑓.
(2) Initialize 𝜆 based on 𝜅 and 𝜂.
(3) Decrypt 𝐶[0] to obtain 𝜏 and 𝛼𝜏.
(4) Generate 𝑠final and modify 𝜆 using 𝜏 (Section 3.5.2).
(5) If |𝐴| is not a 128-bit multiple, pad 𝐴 with a single bit
of “1” followed by all “0” until the required length.
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(6) Encrypt 𝐴[𝑗] for 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑎 and XOR results to obtain𝛼𝐴.
(7) Decrypt 𝐶[𝑗+1] to obtain 𝛼𝑀[𝑗] and𝑀[𝑗], where 0 ≤𝑗 < 𝑚.
(8) Compute ∑𝑀. Encrypt ∑𝑀 and XOR the result with𝛼𝜏, 𝛼𝐴, and 𝛼𝑀[∗]. Perform one final encryption to
obtain 𝑇verify.
(9) Compare 𝑇verify with 𝑇. If they do not match, the
plaintext is not released to the recipient and an error
symbol, Γ, is output.
3.5.4. MAC-Only Mode. The proposed AEAD scheme can
also be used solely as a MAC. In the MAC-only mode, the
algorithm is the same except that ciphertext blocks need
not be computed. In addition, the secret message number is
unused and is set to 𝜏 = 0.
3.6. Features. Chaos-based algorithms require real number
computation which is usually performed using floating point
representation. FxP representation is used to ensure that
the proposed AEAD scheme is not platform-specific. In
addition, it contributes to better performance as basic binary
operations can be used on FxP variables which require fewer
clock cycles than floating point operations.
The proposed cipher has several features that are advan-
tageous for AEAD designs. Firstly, each block of data can be
processed in parallel.The only overhead is the iteration of the
masking algorithm which has to be performed based on the
block number. It is an online, one-pass cipher whereby the
encryption of one block does not depend on other blocks.The
verification algorithm is highly nonce-misuse resistant due
to the randomly generated 𝜏. The proposed AEAD scheme
also has out-of-order verification; whereby if any blocks are
permuted or out of order, it will result in a different MAC.
To achieve high security against cryptanalytic attacks,
users have the option of using a TRNG to generate 𝜏. A
TRNGdepends on physical phenomena; therefore 𝜏 becomes
nondeterministic in nature. Each plaintext is then randomly
mapped to different ciphertexts. However, anyone with the
correct secret key is able to extract 𝜏 to decrypt and verify
the message successfully regardless of how 𝜏 was generated.
Although the randomization of 𝜏 contributes to strong secu-
rity characteristics as described in Section 4.5.4, the proposed
AEAD scheme becomes nonincremental in nature.The entire
associated data or message needs to be recomputed if one
block is changed because 𝜏 changes upon each encryption.
4. Security Analysis
This section examines the security of all components of the
proposed AEAD scheme. For all tests, inputs are set to zero
(𝜅 = 0, 𝜂 = 0, 𝜏 = 0) unless stated otherwise. As it is
difficult to providemathematical proof for real number-based
cryptographic algorithms, the AEAD scheme is evaluated
mainly using statistical means.
4.1. Preliminary Statistical Testing. Before other evaluation
methods are used, statistical test suites such as NIST SP
800-22 [24], DIEHARD [25], and ENT [26] are used as
preliminary tests for majority of the AEAD components.
The minimum/maximum passing ratio (PR) for NIST and
DIEHARD for a significance level of 0.01 is calculated based
on (4), where𝑁 is the number of samples, as follows:
PR = 0.99 ± 3 × √0.99 × 0.01𝑁 . (4)
The summary of inputs required for each test suite is listed
below.
(i) NIST: 1000-Mbit file generated with 𝜅 = 0, 𝜂 = 0, 𝜏 =0, divided into 1000 samples
(ii) DIEHARD: 50 87.5-Mbit files generated with 𝜅 =
rand ( ), 𝜂 = 0, 𝜏 = 0; each DIEHARD suite has 18
tests with multiple 𝑃 values that are each taken as
individual samples
(iii) ENT: 87.5-Mbit file generated with 𝜅 = 0, 𝜂 = 0, 𝜏 =0.
The minimum 𝑃 value to indicate uniformity for each NIST
test is 0.0001 whereas the DIEHARD tests require 𝑃 values in
the range of [0.01, 0.99]. The min/max PR for the NIST and
DIEHARD test suites are listed in Table 6 of the Appendix.
As for the ENT test suite, a number sequence fails if its
results stray too far from the ideal values listed in Table 7
of the Appendix. Passing all three test suites indicates that
the number sequence is pseudorandom with no obvious
statistical defects.
4.2. 𝑆-Box Evaluation. Random s-boxes are generated based
on a chaotic number sequence which is tested using theNIST,
DIEHARD, and ENT test suites. It passes all three as shown
in Tables 8, 12, and 16 of the Appendix. In the following
experiments, s-boxes are produced for 𝜅 = rand ( ), 𝜂 =0, 𝜏 = 0 where their characteristics such as the avalanche
effect, strict avalanche criterion (SAC), linear and differential
probability, nonlinearity, and keyspace are examined.
4.2.1. Avalanche and Strict AvalancheCriterion. To exhibit the
avalanche effect, one-half of the output bits should change on
average whenever a single input bit is toggled. To determine if
an 8-bit s-box fulfils this requirement, the 28 possible inputs
are first divided into 27 pairs, (𝑋,𝑋𝑖), which differ only in bit𝑖. The 8-bit avalanche vectors, 𝑉𝑖, are then calculated for all
(0 ≤ 𝑖 < 8) as follows:
𝑉𝑖 = 𝑠 (𝑋) ⊕ 𝑠 (𝑋𝑖) . (5)
For 10000 random s-boxes all possible input pairs are tested.
Results indicate that 50.1899% of each𝑉𝑖 bits are equal to one
when an input differs in only bit 𝑖.
To satisfy the SAC, each individual output bit should
change with a probability of 50% when a single input bit is
toggled. Similar to the previous test, 28 possible inputs are
first divided into 27 pairs, (𝑋,𝑋𝑖), which differ only in bit𝑖. The 8-bit avalanche vectors, 𝑉𝑖 are then calculated for all
(0 ≤ 𝑖 < 8). For 10000 random s-boxes and all possible
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input pairs, the average probability that a bit location in𝑉𝑖 is equal to one when an input differs in only bit 𝑖 is
50.1993%.
Both results show that the s-boxes generated by the
proposed AEAD scheme have strong avalanche effect and
fulfil the SAC. Satisfying the SAC also implies that the s-box
is a complete function, whereby each output bit is dependent
on all input bits [27].
4.2.2. Differential Distribution and Linear Approximation.
For 10000 randomly generated s-boxes, the differential dis-
tribution [28] and linear approximation [29] tables are com-
puted. These tables consist of the probabilities of differential
and linear characteristics for various input/output combina-
tions that can be used in differential and linear attacks. The
worst case differential and linear probabilities are 2−4.67807
and 2−2.91254, respectively.These probabilities are sufficient to
resist cryptanalytic attacks which are described in Section 4.5.
4.2.3. Nonlinearity and Key Sensitivity. Let F𝑛2 be the 𝑛-
dimensional vector space over the field F2. The nonlinearity
of a function 𝐹 : F𝑛2 → F𝑛2 is defined by
NL (𝐹) = (2𝑛−1 − 12) max𝑎∈F𝑛
2
,𝑏∈F𝑛
2
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 ∑𝑥∈F𝑛2 (−1)
𝑏⋅𝐹(𝑥)+𝑎⋅𝑥
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 . (6)
A perfectly nonlinear function has a nonlinearity of NL(𝐹) =2𝑛−1 − 2𝑛/2−1, which is 120 for an 8-bit s-box. Out of 10000
randomly generated s-boxes, the average nonlinearity is
92.6646, which is 77.22% nonlinear. The generated s-boxes
have lower nonlinearity than the AES s-box (NL(𝐹AES) =112). However, unlike a static s-box, attackers cannot linearly
approximate a randomized s-box without knowledge of the
keys used to generate it. Therefore, slight changes to the
secret key should generate different s-boxes. For all 128-
bit secret keys with hamming weight of one, the proposed
AEAD scheme generates unique s-boxes. In addition, for
2000 incrementally generated s-boxes (𝜅 = 0 to 𝜅 = 7𝑑0),
all s-boxes are also unique.This shows that the random s-box
algorithm is highly sensitive to slight changes to 𝜅.
4.3. Mask Evaluation. The output of the masking algorithm
is first tested using the NIST, DIEHARD, and ENT test suites.
The 128-bit mask values generated by the AEAD scheme
successfully pass all three as shown in Tables 9, 13, and 17 of
the Appendix.
4.3.1. Mask Cycle Length. The cycle length of the masking
algorithm must be sufficiently large to avoid attacks that can
take advantage of any mask value cycles. Theoretically, the
cycle length is limited by the precision of the fixed point
representation used in chaotic iterations. This amounts to230−1, as 30 bits are used to represent the fractional bits.This
is a conservative bound, as chaotic perturbation and chaotic
coupling further extend the cycle length. Because there are
two chaotic maps used to modify the mask registers, the
total cycle length is the least common multiple of their cycle
lengths. Based on this lower bound, the proposed AEAD
scheme will be able to support messages of approximately260 − 1 blocks before a mask cycle occurs.
4.4. Key Schedule Evaluation. The key schedule algorithm
generates only 20 round keys for a secret key. Therefore, data
for the statistical test suites are generated using incremental
secret keys (incremented from 𝜅 = 0) except for the
DIEHARD test which still uses randomly generated secret
keys. Results in Tables 10, 14, and 18 of the Appendix indicate
that the key schedule algorithm passes all test suites.
4.4.1. Avalanche and Strict Avalanche Criterion. The key
schedule algorithm is analysed for avalanche effect and
SAC similar to the s-box evaluation in Section 4.2.1. The
avalanche vectors 𝑉𝑖 are calculated using (5), where 10000
randomly generated pairs of 𝑋,𝑋𝑖 are used as inputs. To
depict the avalanche effect, one-half of each round key
should change on average whenever a single input key bit
is toggled. The percentages of 𝑉𝑖 bits that are equal to one
when the input key differs in only bit 𝑖 are 50.0403%, 49.99%,
50.0719%, 49.9422%, 49.9228%, 49.9047%, 50.0417%,
49.92%, 49.9942%, 49.9925%, 49.8973%, 50.0503%,
50.1373%, 50.0075%, 49.9709%, 49.9975%, 50.0342%,
50.0542%, 49.9628%, and 49.9153% for each of the 20 rounds,
respectively. This has an overall average of 49.9924% per
round.
To fulfil the SAC, each round key bit should change with
a probability of 50% when a single input key bit is toggled.
For each of the 20 rounds, the average probabilities that a
bit location in 𝑉𝑖 is equal to one when the input key differs
in only bit 𝑖 are 49.9998%, 49.9891%, 50.0914%, 49.8953%,
49.9978%, 49.9583%, 49.9866%, 50.0108%, 49.9941%,
49.9044%, 49.9095%, 49.9452%, 50.0287%, 50.0473%,
50.0302%, 50.0439%, 50.0852%, 50.017%, 50.0633%, and
49.9419%. This has an overall average of 49.997% per round.
Results show that the key schedule algorithm has strong
avalanche effect and fulfils the SAC.This implies that the key
schedule algorithm is a complete function, where all round
key bits are dependent on all input secret key bits.
4.5. Encryption Algorithm Security. This section analyses the
security of the AEAD scheme against various cryptanalytic
attacks. A lower bound of security against these attacks is first
determined with 𝜏 = 0. Then, additional security provided
by using a TRNG to generate 𝜏 is discussed. Prior to other
security analyses, the ciphertext of theAEADscheme is tested
using statistical suites with results in Tables 11, 15, and 19.
4.5.1. Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis. The security
bound for differential and linear cryptanalysis can be deter-
mined based on the minimum number of active s-boxes for
a differential characteristic (AS𝑟𝐷) and linear characteristic
(AS𝑟𝐿), where 𝑟 is the number of rounds. The number of
AS is dependent on the type of block shuffle used in the
round function. In an early design, the number 10 block
shuffle from [30] was used in the proposed AEAD scheme,
supposedly with AS20𝐷 /AS20𝐿 = 44. However, a branch and
bound algorithm was used and found that AS20𝐷 /AS20𝐿 = 37.
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Table 2: List of active S-boxes.
Round, 𝑟 AS𝑟𝐷, AS𝑟𝐿
1 0
2 1
3 2
4 3
5 4
6 6
7 8
8 11
9 14
10 18
11 22
12 24
13 27
14 30
15 32
16 35
17 36
18 39
19 41
20 44
Instead, an isomorphic shuffle to the number 10 shuffle was
used, adopted from [31] with AS𝑟𝐷 and AS
𝑟
𝐿 for 1 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 20
shown in Table 2.
Themaximum differential and linear probabilities for the
AEAD scheme’s s-boxes are 𝑃𝐷 = 2−4.67807 and 𝑃𝐿 = 2−2.91254,
respectively asmentioned in Section 4.2.2.The probability for
differential and linear distinguishers are calculated using
𝑃𝑟diff-dist = 𝑃𝐷AS𝑟𝐷 ,
𝑃𝑟lin-dist = 12 + (2AS𝑟𝐿−1 × 𝑃𝐿AS𝑟𝐿) .
(7)
For 𝑟 = 14 and 𝑟 = 16, 𝑃14diff-dist = 2−140.3421 and 𝑃16lin-dist =1/2 + 2−67.9389, where 2−67.9389 is the linear bias, denoted by𝜀lin. The number of plaintexts required for a differential and
linear distinguishing attack is then 1/𝑃14diff-dist = 2140.3421 and1/(𝜀lin)2 = 2135.8778, respectively, which are both more than
the available 2128. Therefore, the full 20 rounds have a safe
security margin against differential and linear cryptanalysis.
4.5.2. Algebraic Attack. In an algebraic attack, s-boxes are
described by an overdefined system of algebraic equations
that hold true with a probability of one [32]. The use of
random s-boxes increases the resistance of a cipher against
this attack [33]. The proposed AEAD scheme uses key-
dependent s-boxes which are further randomized by 𝜏;
therefore it is difficult to obtain a system of equations for
these s-boxes. Without these equations, an algebraic attack is
not feasible.The proposed cipher is thus resistant to algebraic
attacks.
4.5.3. Timing Attack. Timing attacks exploit operations with
data-dependent execution time to reveal the secret key [34,
35]. In the proposed AEAD scheme, the secret key is used
to generate s-boxes and round keys and also to initialize the
mask register. The remaining operations consist of Bitwise
operations that have constant execution time. Therefore, the
proposed cipher is resistant to timing attacks because its
encryption speed is independent of the key value.
4.5.4. Security with True Random Secret Message Number. If𝜏 is generated by a nondeterministic TRNG, the cipher is able
to resist awide range of statistical-based cryptanalytic attacks.
A nondeterministic 𝜏 ensures that multiple encryptions of
even the same (𝐴,𝑀) pair will involve different s-boxes
and masking values. This leads to different (𝐶, 𝑇) outputs.
However, a legitimate recipient can easily decrypt and verify
these ciphertext-MAC pairs as long as the secret key is
correct.
Randomized s-boxes prevent any cryptanalytic attacks
that rely on approximating the behavior of the s-box, such as
differential, linear, and algebraic attacks. Even if an approx-
imation of the s-box is obtained for a particular plaintext-
ciphertext pair, it is only applicable to that specific pair.
The cipher is also immune to attacks that rely on selecting
input differences that cancel out the effect of encryption
keys such as the differential attack, truncated differential
attack, and impossible differential attack. This is because the
masking keys are modified by the truly random 𝜏, making
them nondeterministic for each plaintext encryption. For a
differential characteristic to hold, 𝜏 values for a plaintext pair
have to match, which occurs with a probability of 2−128 for a
uniform TRNG.
Key recovery attacks based on an 𝑟-round statistical
distinguisher involve the encryption of multiple plaintexts
for 𝑟 + 𝑔 rounds to obtain their corresponding (𝑟 + 𝑔)-
round ciphertexts. Attackers then guess subkey bits, decrypt
the ciphertext for 𝑔 rounds, and verify their guess based on
the 𝑟-round statistical distinguisher. If 𝜏 is nondeterministic,
attackers will not be able to obtain the correct subkey
using this method as each plaintext is encrypted based on
different s-boxes andmasking keys. In practice, the statistical
distinguisher only holds if two plaintexts are encrypted with
same 𝜏, which again occurs with a probability of 2−128 for a
uniform TRNG.
As previously mentioned, generating 𝜏 using a TRNG
makes the cipher misuse resistant. If the same nonce is used
twice, the resulting MAC and ciphertext are still secure as
long as 𝜏 is not repeated for the same (𝐴,𝑀, 𝜂) 3-tuple.
In short, implementing the proposed AEAD scheme with
a TRNG or even a hybrid RNG will strengthen its immu-
nity against statistical-based cryptanalysis as well as user
misuse.
4.6.MACSecurity. This section analyses the statistical quality
of the authentication tag produced by the proposed AEAD
scheme. In the following experiments, the input parameters
are set to 𝜅 = 0, 𝜂 = 0, 𝜏 = 0, whereby only 𝐴 and𝑀 vary.
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4.6.1. Statistical Analysis of Diffusion and Confusion. In this
test, an (𝐴,𝑀) pair is randomly generated and its correspond-
ing tag, 𝑇, is computed. Next, a random bit within the (𝐴,𝑀)
pair is toggled and its corresponding tag, 𝑇󸀠, is computed. 𝑇
and 𝑇󸀠 values are compared and the number of changes at
each bit location is stored as 𝑋𝑖. The following equations are
then computed:
Mean Changed Bit Number
𝑋 = 1𝑁
𝑁∑
𝑖=1
𝑋𝑖. (8)
Mean Changed Probability
𝑃 = 𝑋128 × 100%. (9)
Standard Variance of the Changed Bit Number
Δ𝑋 = √ 1𝑁 − 1
𝑁∑
𝑖=1
(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋)2. (10)
Table 3: Statistical results for 128-bit hash values of the proposed
hash function.
Param/𝑁 1024 2048 10000 Mean𝑋 64.0010 64.0078 63.9968 64.0019𝑃 (%) 50.0008 50.0061 49.9975 50.0015Δ𝑋 5.6291 5.6755 5.6291 5.6446Δ𝑃 (%) 4.3977 4.4340 4.3978 4.4098𝑋min 47 45 45 45.67𝑋max 83 83 86 84
Table 4: Number of hits.
Hits 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Theoretical 9416 572 12 0 0 0 0
Experimental 9428 558 13 1 0 0 0
Table 5: Absolute difference.
Results Minimum Maximum Mean
Theoretical — — 1360
Experimental 574 2352 1362.55
Standard Variance
Δ𝑃 = √ 1𝑁 − 1
𝑁∑
𝑖=1
( 𝑋𝑖128 − 𝑃)
2 × 100%, (11)
where 𝑁 is the number of trials. The test is performed for𝑁 = 1024/2048/10000 and the results are tabulated in
Table 3. The distribution plot and histogram of 𝑋𝑖 for 𝑁 =10000 are shown in Figures 7 and 6. Results show that the
MAC values have a mean changed bit number, 𝑋, and mean
changed probability, 𝑃, that are near-ideal (64 bits and 50%).
Low standard variance values depict strong diffusion and
confusion capabilities. In Figures 7 and 6, 𝑋𝑖 is shown to be
evenly and normally distributed centering on 64 bits. These
near-ideal statistical results indicate that the slightest change
to the 𝐴 or𝑀 will produce a different authentication tag.
4.6.2. Analysis of Collision Resistance. Similar to Section 4.6.1,
MACs for an (𝐴,𝑀) pair and a slightly modified (𝐴,𝑀)󸀠
pair are produced and stored in ASCII format. The two
MACs are compared and the number of hits (equal ASCII
characters in the same position) are counted. Next, the
absolute difference, 𝐷, between the two MACs is calculated
as follows:
𝐷 = 𝑁∑
𝑖=1
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝑑 (𝑒𝑖) − 𝑑 (𝑒󸀠𝑖)󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 , (12)
where 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒󸀠𝑖 are the 𝑖th entry of the original and modified
MAC, while the function 𝑑(∗) converts the entry to its
equivalent decimal value. The test results for 10000 trials are
compared against theoretical values (see [36] for calculation
of theoretical values) in Tables 4 and 5. Results indicate that
the proposed AEAD scheme has strong collision resistance as
the experimental results are near-ideal.
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Table 6: Passing Ratios for NIST and DIEHARD.
Test name Samples Min. PR Max. PR
NIST (except random excursions) 1000 0.981 0.999
NIST, random excursions 625 0.978 1.000
DIEHARD, birthday spacings 500 0.977 1.000
DIEHARD, overlapping 5-permutation 100 0.961 1.000
DIEHARD, binary rank 31 × 31 matrices 50 0.949 1.000
DIEHARD, binary rank 32 × 32 matrices 50 0.949 1.000
DIEHARD, binary rank 6 × 8 matrices 1300 0.982 0.998
DIEHARD, bitstream 1000 0.981 0.999
DIEHARD, overlapping-pairs-sparse-occupancy 1150 0.981 0.999
DIEHARD, overlapping-quadruples-sparse-occupancy 1400 0.9822 0.998
DIEHARD, DNA spacings 1550 0.983 0.997
DIEHARD, Count-the-1s on a Stream of Bytes 100 0.961 1.000
DIEHARD, count-the-1s on specific bytes 1250 0.982 0.998
DIEHARD, parking lot 550 0.978 1.000
DIEHARD, minimum distance 50 0.949 1.000
DIEHARD, 3D-spheres 1050 0.984 0.999
DIEHARD, squeeze 50 0.949 1.000
DIEHARD, overlapping sums 550 0.978 1.000
DIEHARD, runs 200 0.969 1.000
DIEHARD, craps 100 0.961 1.000
Table 7: Ideal values for ENT test suite.
Test name Ideal value
Entropy 8.0
Chi-square 50%
Arithmetic mean 127.5
Monte Carlo value for 𝜋 3.141592653
Serial correlation coefficient 9
Table 8: NIST: S-box chaotic sequence.
Test name 𝑃 value Passing ratio Result
Frequency 0.771469 0.993 Pass
Block frequency 0.759756 0.989 Pass
Cumulative sums 0.122325 0.990 Pass
Runs 0.179584 0.990 Pass
Longest run 0.446556 0.989 Pass
Rank 0.568739 0.993 Pass
FFT 0.689019 0.991 Pass
Nonoverlapping templates 0.224821 0.981 Pass
Overlapping templates 0.146152 0.984 Pass
Universal 0.011383 0.982 Pass
Approximate entropy 0.042808 0.987 Pass
Random excursions 0.173679 0.987 Pass
Random excursions variant 0.711017 0.981 Pass
Serial 0.803720 0.981 Pass
Linear complexity 0.660012 0.990 Pass
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Figure 8: Distribution of MAC.
4.6.3. MAC Distribution. To resist statistical attacks, a MAC
has to be evenly distributed at each bit position. Analysis of
theMACdistribution starts with generating a random (𝐴,𝑀)
pair and its modified version with one toggled bit, (𝐴,𝑀)󸀠.
The MAC of both messages is compared, and the number
of changes at each bit location is counted. For 𝑁 = 10000,
the minimum, maximum, and mean changed bit number are
4877, 5150, and 5002.3, respectively, with the distribution plot
shown in Figure 8. The mean changed bit number is close to
the theoretical value of 5000, where the maximum distance
from ideal for each changed bit value is 150.This indicates that
proposed AEAD scheme produces evenly distributed MAC
values as depicted in Figure 8.
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Table 9: NIST: Masking algorithm.
Test Name 𝑃 value Passing ratio Result
Frequency 0.390721 0.991 Pass
Block frequency 0.530120 0.987 Pass
Cumulative sums 0.259616 0.989 Pass
Runs 0.406499 0.992 Pass
Longest run 0.307077 0.989 Pass
Rank 0.066882 0.991 Pass
FFT 0.556460 0.981 Pass
Nonoverlapping templates 0.238035 0.982 Pass
Overlapping templates 0.676615 0.984 Pass
Universal 0.834308 0.992 Pass
Approximate entropy 0.915317 0.991 Pass
Random excursions 0.582671 0.979 Pass
Random excursions variant 0.422281 0.993 Pass
Serial 0.875539 0.984 Pass
Linear complexity 0.890582 0.989 Pass
Table 10: NIST: Key schedule.
Test Name 𝑃 value Passing ratio Result
Frequency 0.085587 0.991 Pass
Block frequency 0.008629 0.989 Pass
Cumulative sums 0.719747 0.990 Pass
Runs 0.143686 0.990 Pass
Longest run 0.467322 0.989 Pass
Rank 0.363593 0.993 Pass
FFT 0.015816 0.987 Pass
Nonoverlapping templates 0.540204 0.981 Pass
Overlapping templates 0.065230 0.988 Pass
Universal 0.401199 0.991 Pass
Approximate entropy 0.077131 0.996 Pass
Random excursions 0.098397 0.982 Pass
Random excursions variant 0.884892 0.984 Pass
Serial 0.446556 0.989 Pass
Linear complexity 0.249284 0.990 Pass
4.7. Advantage over AES-GCM. The proposed scheme has
several advantages over AES-GCM which is currently the
official standard for authenticated encryption [37]. Firstly,
the proposed AEAD scheme does not have any identified
weak keys unlike AES-GCM [6]. It is also resistant to nonce-
misuse, providing full privacy and integrity even if nonce
is repeated, unlike AES-GCM which requires unique nonce
values for security [37]. Most software-based AES implemen-
tations are susceptible to cache timing attacks [35], whereas
the proposed cipher has a constant time implementation
due to simple binary operations. AES-GCM’s security bound
for integrity is equal to half the tag length [6] whereas the
proposedAEADscheme is able to provide full 128-bit security
for integrity. Furthermore, the proposed AEAD scheme also
has the flexibility to be implemented with a TRNG for
immunity to statistical-based attacks.
Table 11: NIST: ciphertext.
Test name 𝑃 value Passing ratio Result
Frequency 0.206629 0.989 Pass
Block frequency 0.207730 0.997 Pass
Cumulative sums 0.206629 0.990 Pass
Runs 0.373625 0.995 Pass
Longest run 0.016149 0.987 Pass
Rank 0.388990 0.989 Pass
FFT 0.954930 0.987 Pass
Nonoverlapping templates 0.454053 0.982 Pass
Overlapping templates 0.467322 0.985 Pass
Universal 0.129620 0.985 Pass
Approximate entropy 0.358641 0.990 Pass
Random excursions 0.866173 0.986 Pass
Random excursions variant 0.956262 0.991 Pass
Serial 0.887645 0.992 Pass
Linear complexity 0.271619 0.986 Pass
Table 12: DIEHARD: S-box chaotic sequence.
Test name Passing ratio Result
Birthday spacings 0.978 Pass
Overlapping 5-permutation 0.970 Pass
Binary Rank 31 × 31 matrices 0.980 Pass
Binary Rank 32 × 32 matrices 1.00 Pass
Binary Rank 6 × 8 matrices 0.985 Pass
Bitstream 0.982 Pass
Overlapping-pairs-sparse-occupancy 0.982 Pass
Overlapping-quadruples-sparse-occupancy 0.983 Pass
DNA spacings 0.985 Pass
Count-the-1s on a stream of bytes 0.980 Pass
Count-the-1s on specific bytes 0.983 Pass
Parking lot 0.978 Pass
Minimum distance 0.960 Pass
3D-spheres 0.990 Pass
Squeeze 0.960 Pass
Overlapping sums 0.985 Pass
Runs 0.980 Pass
Craps 0.990 Pass
In terms of performance, the speed of AES-GCM was
compared against the proposed cipher on a computer with an
Intel i7-4700MQprocessor and 8GBof RAM.The implemen-
tation of AES-GCM was taken from the Crypto++ Library
5.6.2 [38].The proposedAEAD scheme has a speed of 2401.73
Megabits/second compared to 1601.4 Megabits/second of
AES-GCM, approximately 1.5 times faster.The algorithm can
still be further optimized for improved performance.
5. Conclusion
This paper introduced a new chaos-based authenticated
encryption with associated data (AEAD) scheme. It is based
on the single-key Even-Mansour construction and Type-II
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Table 13: DIEHARD: masking algorithm.
Test Name Passing Ratio Result
Birthday spacings 0.982 Pass
Overlapping 5-permutation 0.970 Pass
Binary rank 31 × 31 matrices 1.000 Pass
Binary rank 32 × 32 matrices 0.960 Pass
Binary rank 6 × 8 matrices 0.982 Pass
Bitstream 0.982 Pass
Overlapping-pairs-sparse-occupancy 0.983 Pass
Overlapping-quadruples-sparse-occupancy 0.984 Pass
DNA spacings 0.984 Pass
Count-the-1s on a stream of bytes 0.990 Pass
Count-the-1s on specific bytes 0.984 Pass
Parking lot 0.980 Pass
Minimum distance 0.960 Pass
3D-spheres 0.985 Pass
Squeeze 0.980 Pass
Overlapping sums 0.980 Pass
Runs 0.990 Pass
Craps 0.990 Pass
Table 14: DIEHARD: key schedule.
Test name Passing ratio Result
Birthday spacings 0.982 Pass
Overlapping 5-permutation 0.970 Pass
Binary rank 31 × 31 matrices 0.980 Pass
Binary rank 32 × 32 matrices 1.000 Pass
Binary rank 6 × 8 matrices 0.982 Pass
Bitstream 0.982 Pass
Overlapping-pairs-sparse-occupancy 0.983 Pass
Overlapping-quadruples-sparse-occupancy 0.982 Pass
DNA spacings 0.983 Pass
Count-the-1s on a stream of bytes 0.970 Pass
Count-the-1s on specific bytes 0.982 Pass
Parking lot 0.980 Pass
Minimum distance 0.980 Pass
3D-spheres 0.984 Pass
Squeeze 1.000 Pass
Overlapping sums 0.987 Pass
Runs 0.975 Pass
Craps 0.970 Pass
generalized Feistel with random s-boxes. The chaotic tent
map was used to generate Even-Mansour whitening keys,
round keys, and s-boxes used in the Feistel round functions.
Chaotic perturbations were included in the proposed design
to overcome weaknesses of unimodal chaotic maps. For
improved performance, the fixed point representation was
used for all real number operations. Results of rigorous statis-
tical testing have shown that the proposed AEAD scheme has
no observable statistical defects. In addition, it is resistant to
cryptanalytic attacks such as the differential, linear, algebraic,
and timing attacks. To increase its immunity against all
Table 15: DIEHARD: ciphertext.
Test name Passing ratio Result
Birthday spacings 0.982 Pass
Overlapping 5-permutation 0.970 Pass
Binary rank 31 × 31 matrices 0.980 Pass
Binary rank 32 × 32 matrices 0.980 Pass
Binary rank 6 × 8 matrices 0.982 Pass
Bitstream 0.987 Pass
Overlapping-pairs-sparse-Occupancy 0.982 Pass
Overlapping-quadruples-sparse-occupancy 0.984 Pass
DNA Spacings 0.985 Pass
Count-the-1s on a stream of bytes 0.970 Pass
Count-the-1s on specific bytes 0.983 Pass
Parking lot 0.978 Pass
Minimum distance 0.980 Pass
3D-spheres 0.983 Pass
Squeeze 0.960 Pass
Overlapping sums 0.980 Pass
Runs 0.970 Pass
Craps 1.000 Pass
Table 16: ENT: S-box chaotic sequence.
Test name Test value Result
Entropy 7.999984 Pass
Chi-square 55.13% Pass
Arithmetic mean 127.5205 Pass
Monte Carlo value for 𝜋 3.140525649 Pass
Serial correlation coefficient −0.000300 Pass
Table 17: ENT: masking algorithm.
Test name Test value Result
Entropy 7.999984 Pass
Chi-square 55.08% Pass
Arithmetic mean 127.4735 Pass
Monte Carlo value for 𝜋 3.141910973 Pass
Serial correlation coefficient −0.000407 Pass
Table 18: ENT: vey schedule.
Test Name Test value Result
Entropy 7.999984 Pass
Chi-square 62.61 Pass
Arithmetic mean 127.4953 Pass
Monte Carlo value for 𝜋 3.140523556 Pass
Serial correlation coefficient −0.000304 Pass
statistical-based attacks, the AEAD can be implemented
alongside a true random number generator to map messages
to various ciphertexts in an unpredictable manner. It also
has better performance than AES-GCM which is the current
standard in authenticated encryption, with a throughput
of approximately 2401.73 Megabits/second. In short, the
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Table 19: ENT: Ciphertext.
Test name Test value Result
Entropy 7.999984 Pass
Chi-square 55.43% Pass
Arithmetic mean 127.5039 Pass
Monte Carlo value for 𝜋 3.141705895 Pass
Serial correlation coefficient 0.000032 Pass
proposed chaos-basedAEAD scheme is a viable alternative to
AES-GCM in terms of providing both privacy and integrity
in a unified scheme.
Appendix
See Tables 6–19.
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